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CASE NOTES
responsible for the defective product causing injury, was held not subject to
Maryland State Court jurisdiction. It would therefore seem apparent that
this former defendant would not qualify under any existing test, as subject
to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court. Yet by the kind of strict appli-
cation of the statute which occurred with respect to Montanin, Jones &
Laughlin would likewise be held subject to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota
court.
Should the theory of the Atkins decision remain undisturbed, there is
the danger that a formal statutory definition of "doing business" would re-
place the substance requirement of "minimum contacts." A corporate manu-
facturer would be subject to suit anywhere that a consumer might carry
his product, or whence it might wend its way by resale, as long as a similar
statute were provided. This would hardly be within the traditional notions
of "fair play and substantial justice" since no consideration would be given
to the extent of the corporate activity, the systematic or continuous nature
of such activity, the points of contact of the activity within the state, or the
parens patrioe interest of the state in the dangerous nature of the activity
akin to the non-resident motorist cases. Instead this decision would eliminate,
in a tort action, the necessity for the evaluation proposed in International
Shoe, and narrow the test to the single factor of injury within the forum
state. Removal of the restrictions imposed in Hanson v. Denckla 23 and other
cases,24
 by the Supreme Court of the United States must precede the affirma-
tion of this decision, since it is hardly within the purview of a state to alter
so sweepingly the Constitutional tests for jurisdiction.
CARROLL E. DUBUC
Constitutional Law—State Application of Privilege Tax to Carrier in
Interstate and Intrastate Commeree.—Oregon-Nevada-California
Fast Freight, Inc. v. Stewart. 1—The taxpayer was an interstate motor
carrier with its main office in California, but with terminals in Oregon, which
it leased. Taxpayer engaged primarily in interstate commerce but did have
some intrastate operations in Oregon. An Oregon statute imposed an excise
tax for the privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state of Oregon. 2
The tax assessed was under an apportionment formula which compared the
total miles traveled in Oregon by the taxpayer to the total mileage traveled
by taxpayer in its entire operation . 3
 The resulting fraction was applied to
the carrier's net income to determine the amount of the tax. The defendant
tax commissioner assessed a tax under the statute; the taxpayer paid
under protest and then commenced suit for a refund. The taxpayer con-
23 Supra note 8.
24 Supra note 4.
1 353 P.2d .541 (Ore. 1960).
2 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 317.070 [amended by c. 607 § 3, c. 709 § 1(3), (1957); c. 631
§ 2 (1959)1.
3 Ore. Rev. Stat.	 317.180 (Repealed), now replaced by § 314.280 (1959).
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ceded that if the same tax was labeled an income tax, it would have been
constitutional; and the State conceded that if taxpayer's business was en-
tirely interstate, the tax couldn't have been assessed. 4 The lower court found
the tax to be invalid and on appeal the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed.
The Court left the parties where it found them in that it did not decide the
exact nature of the tax since neither party chose to press the issue further.
HELD: The tax was constitutional because the apportionment formula was not
invalid even though it included taxpayer's interstate miles traveled in Oregon,
because taxpayer failed to show any burden on interstate commerce by the
apportionment as applied.
The fact that the taxpayer could concede that, if the tax was labeled
an income tax, he would have to pay it, exposes an anomaly in the law. If
taxpayer's admission is to be taken at face value, he concedes that except
for the technicality of the label the tax bears, he has no cause of action. The
reasons for this admission and possible solutions to the dilemma posed
thereby, constitute a perplexing problem for student and practitioner.
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld state taxes on the
net income of a foreign corporation derived from interstate commerce when
such income is properly apportioned. 8 The same Court has upheld ad valorem
property taxes on the property of a corporation engaged in interstate
commerce.° Taxes based on gross receipts caused more difficulty since they
could be levied whether or not a corporation showed a profit; yet use taxes
based on properly apportioned gross receipts have been upheld .' as have
apportioned taxes levied on gross receipts in lieu of property taxes. 8 Cor-
porate franchise taxes have been upheld when measured by apportioned net
income or by value of capital within the state. 1 °
A privilege tax, the type levied in this case, was discussed in the land-
mark case of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor." This tax was con-
strued to be a privilege tax by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in a
declaratory judgment proceeding. A divided United States Supreme Court
held that since Spector was engaged solely in interstate activity the tax was
invalid as a direct burden on interstate commerce. The wording of the
majority opinion in the Spector Case coupled with the interpretation of
Mr. Justice Clark in his dissent12 lend credence to the theory that had
4 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450 (1958), The
reasonableness of the apportionment formula there involved was not contested by the
parties.
6 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
7 Canton R.R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1950); Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1947).
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
9 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
to Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
11 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
12 340 U.S. 610 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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Spector been engaged in any intrastate commerce whatsoever, the tax would
have been upheld."
If the above interpretation of the Spector Case is accepted, the present
tax would seem to be valid even though a privilege tax, because the taxpayer
is engaged in some intrastate operations. In the light of the decisions noted,
however, it seems strange that the label should make a difference. When
first devised, the labels served to determine what type of tax was being
levied, but as the years have passed, the labels have become the end rather
than the means to reach the end. A formalistic approach has been followed
which ignores substance and accepts the name of the tax as conclusive of its
effect. The tax levied in the instant case while called a privilege tax was
measured by net income and was subject to only the normal methods of col-
lection. If the collection of the tax was made a condition precedent to doing
interstate business in Oregon, thus raising a form of tariff barrier at the state
boundary, it would be a true privilege tax, and therefore, clearly an uncon-
stitutional burden on interstate commerce. The tax in substance, however,
appeared merely to reach taxpayer's net income attributable to Oregon, as
does the normal state corporation income tax which has previously been
held valid.' 4
The actual substance of the tax should be considered controlling, and
if the tax is a burden on interstate commerce, in fact, as opposed to in name
only, or if it discriminates against interstate commerce, it should be invalid."
While the best possible cure for the present dilemma of labels is either
a clarifying decision by the United States Supreme Court or Congressional
action, little has been forthcoming. The issue was not pressed in the instant
case, and certiorari was denied; therefore, we cannot hope for a solution
through it. Congress has ventured into the field once by enacting Public
Law 86-272." In its substantive sense it merely forbids the collection of a
state income tax from a foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate com-
merce within the taxing state, if only solicitation of orders was carried on
within the state and such orders resulted in the filling, processing, accepting
or rejecting of the order outside the state. However, it does create a com-
mittee which will study the problem of state income taxes levied on con-
cerns in interstate commerce and enter a report of proposed legislation on or
before July 1, 1962.
For the present, the states, it appears, must be certain to label a tax
correctly, for even if it serves to reach an incident of commerce which may
be taxed, it must approach this incident from a correct constitutional chan-
nel, both insofar as substance is concerned, and also with regard to label.
ROBERT F. SYLVIA
13 See Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California,
297 U.S. 441 (1936), a prior case which supports this view.
14 Supra note 5.
15 See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1951), where
a discriminatory tax was struck down.
16 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. I§ 391 -84 (Supp. 1959).
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